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The UK government, led by Prime Minister Theresa May, has, today (March 29th, 2017) triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which starts the formal process of Brexit, and ends the UK's 44-year membership of the EU. Under the Article, the two parties have up to 2 years to negotiate three things:
Much debate in recent weeks has been around the kind of relationship the UK and the EU will have post-Brexit. A great deal has been written about the relative costs and benefits of remaining in the single market or customs union - the so-called 'soft-Brexit' options - compared with a 'harder' approach, where the UK and EU negotiate a new comprehensive trade agreement or even adopts the so-called WTO-rules approach. What is clear is that the UK government has rejected the soft approach to Brexit, as Mrs. May made clear in January of this year (see below). Given that 'taking back control' of borders was central to the 'Leave' campaign, and free movement of labour across the EU remains one of the four central pillars of the EU, and some form of 'hard' Brexit seems inevitable.
For more background, listen to Oliver Ilott's recent Podcast on Brexit.
Also read Oliver Ilott's analysis of
what to expect during the next two years.
Also read Oliver Ilott's analysis of what to expect during the next two years.
In her speech (January 17th, 2017) Prime Minister Theresa May laid out the government's objectives for its Brexit negotiations.
As she has done before, Mrs. May stated that the UK would remain open for business in a post-Brexit world.
She confirmed that retaining the strength of the 'union' (of the UK) would be central to government plans and objectives, and that she did not intend that Brexit would weaken the EU, even though this is, in some way, a likely consequence of Brexit. She went on to stress that the UK's unwritten constitution made UK citizens prefer to hold its government more directly to account than is possible within the EU.
Mrs. May stressed that she expected the UK to work closely with the EU to create a new mutually beneficial trade relationship - a new kind of partnership with Europe.
Most critically, Brexit will, she announced, be a 'clean' Brexit, with the UK leaving the single market, while still aiming at achieving a mutually beneficial relationship between the UK and the EU. Mrs. May went on to outline the UK government's key objectives, which include:
The main reason for the negative forecasts prior to the vote was the assessment that, while the benefits of remaining in the EU seemed clear, the benefits of leaving were far less clear, especially given the uncertainty about how Brexit negotiations would unfold. A view did emerge that the UK might find it difficult to compensate for the loss of the benefits that being an EU member bring, which include:
Add to these benefits the fact that UK trade as a share of national
income – trade openness - has risen to over 60% in the past decade,
compared to under 30% in the years before the UK joined the EU, the
economic case against Brexit was a
strong one. Of course, the net effects of Brexit
Of course, the net effects of Brexitwill depend on the kind of trade agreements that will be reached, and how resilient the UK economy remains during the negotiating phase.
This option would involve the UK negotiating a completely new free trade agreement with the EU, similar perhaps to that enjoyed by Canada, although both the UK and EU negotiators have been at pains to stress that comparisons with existing agreements could be a hindrance to successful negotiations. The UK government has already stated that, in its view, a complete 'reset' of trade relationships is unnecessary and undesirable, and that a deal should build on the relationships that already exist. Clearly EU negotiators are likely to be reluctant to fast-track an EU-UK FTA, or be a party to an agreement which makes leaving the EU a better prospect than staying in. Indeed, in his initial response to the triggering of Article 50, Donald Tusk referred to 'damage limitation' in terms of protecting the interests of the remaining 27 nations.
What an FTA can achieve is to go further than the basic WTO-rules approach. In essence, an FTA can reduce trade barriers below those associated with the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) approach of the WTO.
The WTO scenario is, in essence, the 'last-call' option if all else fails. It means that a country’s trade is subject only to the rules of the WTO club. If the UK adopted this approach it would be subject to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rules of the WTO. The main principle of this WTO rule is that members should not be discriminated against and, in the absence of specific free trade agreements, all members should enjoy the same treatment as the most favoured country.
The WTO system ensures that each member, which is free to set its own tariff levels, must apply these tariffs in a consistent way against all other members. This means that, in a post-Brexit world, the UK must trade with the EU under the same conditions as it trades with other countries, and the EU must treat the UK as fairly as it treats other non-EU members.
Hence, if one member grants
another member a special trade advantage, the same advantage should be
conferred on all other members. Adopting this policy would, of course,
mean that the UK would not have free access to the EU, and could not
influence EU trade rules.
If, however, the UK opts for an FTA approach with the EU, both
parties could negotiate a deal which provides a more advantageous
arrangement than under WTO rules.
If, however, the UK opts for an FTA approach with the EU, both parties could negotiate a deal which provides a more advantageous arrangement than under WTO rules.
There are possible options, although much less likely, including:
There are possible options, although much less likely, including:
The unilateral free trade scenario is a variant of the WTO scenario, where UK goods and services are faced with the tariff levels agreed through the WTO, but where the UK reduces its tariff levels on imports without any reciprocal reduction by trading partners. This is widely thought to be the least likely option, although New Zealand and Singapore have successfully adopted this kind of approach. For example, Singapore has negotiated 20 free trade agreements with its 31 main trading partners.
The models used by key forecasters in the run-up to the referendum assumed the unilateral free trade approach to be the worst-case scenario. While unilateral elimination of tariffs gives away key ‘bargaining chips’ in future trade negotiations, some economists (especially those in the Economists for Brexit group) believe that the unilateral free trade route would lead to the greatest long term gains for the UK. This view is based on the belief that any form of protectionism distorts trade patterns to the detriment of all parties. However, Economists for Brexit and other 'free traders' recognise that the UK’s agricultural and industrial sectors are likely to be severely squeezed, as the lack of a comparative advantage in these areas will be exposed by unilateral free trade.
The EEA (European Economic Area) scenario involves the UK leaving the EU, but continuing as a member of the wider EEA. The EEA includes the remaining 27 EU countries, together with the four European Free Trade Area (EFTA) states of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
EFTA was founded in 1960 as a counterbalance to the more politically
focussed European Economic Community (EEC) as it then was, and included
Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. In 1973, the United Kingdom and Denmark left EFTA to join the
EC (as it had then become) and were followed by Portugal in 1986 and by
Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. In recent years, EFTA has
successfully concluded free trade agreements with North America and
Asia. Supporters of this option have argued that the UK could, fairly
quickly, become a fifth member of EFTA. However, in this scenario there
would still be free and uncontrolled movement of labour into the UK, and
a budget contribution to the EU, while at the same time EFTA-only
members have no influence on EU trade rules in the future. There seems a
consensus among analysts that this EU-lite option would put the UK at a
significant disadvantage in terms of influencing the direction of the EU
going forward. It is for this reason that UK negotiators are highly
unlikely to see the EEA option as desirable.
It is for this reason that UK negotiators are highly unlikely to see the EEA option as desirable.
In terms of FDI, independent analysis by the
Institute of Fiscal
Studies (IFS) prior to the referendum vote, concluded that it is
most probable that flows will fall after Brexit. However, evidence so
far suggests that this is unlikely to be as significant as first
thought. If FDI does fall, it is likely to
reduce productivity (given that
productivity relies on the level of
capital investment) which will have a negative impact on
GDP. Lower FDI
will have both demand and supply-side implications for all key
macro-economic performance indicators, including growth, jobs and trade.
Of course, until the divorce settlement, the transitional arrangement,
and the nature of the long term relationship becomes clear, investors
are likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach.
Of course, until the divorce settlement, the transitional arrangement, and the nature of the long term relationship becomes clear, investors are likely to adopt a wait-and-see approach.
Given that the EU sets regulation in many areas, including the environment, health and safety, employment and financial services, exit from the EU is likely to lead to a reduction in the level of regulation. However, many analysts have concluded that the effects of this may be fairly modest given that the UK is a relatively unregulated economy compared with many others.
It is likely that there will be two different, and contradictory, effects of Brexit on public finances. Firstly, the positive mechanical effect, which means that leaving the EU will strengthen the public finances in the short term as a result of a fall in net contributions of the order of £8bn a year - the gross contribution of £18.8bn, less the rebate and the return back of funds from the EU budget. However, a second and stronger negative effect, the national income effect, suggests that a possible slow down in GDP as a result of Brexit will weaken public finances, as tax receipts fall and spending increases. Whatever the impact, there is likely to be a significant delay in its effect given that the mechanical effect will only happen once the UK ceases to make payments to the EU, which may well not be until at least 2018/19.
Research suggests that, apart from the US, web users are highly inward looking, generating a strong home-bias in favour of local online suppliers and internet providers, suggesting that trading in the digital world is both less open than we might believe, but also dominated by US based companies. While the internet should reduce ‘economic distance’ between countries, the home-bias effect may well counteract this. With its many languages, different cultural preferences, and inward looking approach to the digital economy, many doubt that the EU is best placed to cope with the new realities of a digital world. Although the EU has made some progress in liberating the digital market-place, many feel that the UK should adopt a much more outward looking approach.
One view is that once the UK has ‘cut loose from its orbit’ around the EU it can connect more closely to the US, which dominates the digital economy, and where the ‘economic distance’ between the UK, US, Canada, Australia and other English speaking nations is much smaller than between the UK and the EU. The same may be said of the emerging power-houses of China and India, and indeed many see Brexit as a considerable opportunity for the UK to have a much closer relationship with these two countries.
Perhaps the single biggest unknown is the impact of Brexit on the UK’s financial sector. In the early days after the Brexit vote many were claiming that the UK would suffer irreparable damage, and certainly shares in UK banks were some of the worst to suffer - along with those of house-builders.
The UK is a dominant player in global financial markets, and has the largest market share of EU business in financial services - double that of France and Germany. How Brexit negotiations unfold will be highly significant to the UK’s financial sector.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Brexit for the UK’s financial services is the potential loss of so called ‘passporting rights’. This relates to the ability of banks and other financial institutions in one EU state to conduct business in another one. As a member of the EU, national banks and financial institutions do not need to obtain licenses in each country. It is certainly too early to tell exactly how Brexit will affect financial services at the global level, and in terms of the UK and the EU.
The impact of Brexit on the UK’s farming sector is also likely to be considerable, given that over 50% of farm income in the UK comes from CAP support. However, until new trade deals have been negotiated, and the UK government has made its position clear on subsidies, the overall impact on farming remains unknown.
As well as introduce a new outward looking approach to trade policy designed for the post-Brexit era, many see Brexit as an opportunity to develop a whole new range of domestic policies. Many argue that the UK has neglected its industrial base, and its infrastructure, and it is time to develop a new industrial policy for the post-Brexit age. This could also be said for technology policy and innovation.
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